12 Mig-29 of Myanmar Air Force

21 Juni 2001
MiG-29 of the Myanmar Air Force (photo : Airliners)

Russian sources report that RSK-MiG has signed a $130 million contract for 10 MiG-29s for the Myanmar air force, ending a two-year drought in export orders.

The price is extremely low - eight aircraft were delivered to Bangladesh in 1999 for $15 million each, and Eritrea's six aircraft cost a reported $8 million each - and 30% of the contract value is to be paid in advance with the rest being paid in installments over 10 years. The aircraft were manufactured at the beginning of the 1990s, for the Russian air forces, who were unable to pay for them. They have been in store at MiG's Lukhovitsky factory airfield ever since.

Upgrade

The cut-price sale will provide much-needed funds for the development of the company's MiG-29 upgrade programmes. Last year was a particularly bad one for the Design Bureau, which earned $100 million from exports, with virtually nothing from state orders. MiG hopes that the Myanmar order may augur in a new round of orders, and while the company recognises that the Cold War era of massive domestic sales has gone forever feels that it can match its successes in 1995, when 36 MiG-29 exports earned the company $1 billion. Bangladesh is reportedly on the verge of placing an order for a further 16 MiG-29s.

Myanmar's Losing Military Strategy

Myanmar reported have received 30 Serbia's Nora B-52 truck-mounted howitzer (photo : Military Today)

Despite its newer, more modern weaponry, Myanmar's ambitious military-modernization campaign is proving ineffectual in fighting the various ethnic armies along its borders. Myanmar's army, also known as the Tatmadaw, remains the same light-infantry force that it was 50 years ago, as evidenced by its current offensive against the Karen National Union (KNU) and other armed insurgencies along its eastern border with Thailand.

There is no end in sight for Myanmar's grinding 57-year-old civil war, despite the extensive military upgrades. Rather than win over the ethnic-minority population through political dialogue, providing sustainable economic opportunities and building and equipping schools and health facilities, the army has launched repeated military offensives into areas where ethnic groups resist the rule of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). These operations, because of the accompanying human-rights abuses, have over the years only fueled the insurgencies.

Although ceasefires have been agreed with some of the ethnic insurgents, several, including the KNU, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Shan State Army (South) and the Chin National Front, are still fighting the regime. Meanwhile, the SPDC junta's relations with some of the ceasefire groups are shaky. Many ceasefire groups are unhappy with the lack of political progress and there is the possibility that, if pressured, some or all of the groups could go back to armed struggle.

Despite this, the SPDC seems to believe that its counterinsurgency strategy is working and is instead concentrating on protecting itself from foreign invasion. It has bought expensive military hardware, expanded conscription into government-run militias in both the countryside and the cities and, in its most extravagant move, relocated the capital from coastal Yangon to inland Pyinmana.

Aggressive spending

In the past decade, the SPDC has spent hundreds of millions of US dollars on military hardware and greatly expanded its artillery and armored units with an eye toward developing a conventional defense capacity. Over that period, military-related expenditures have accounted for nearly half of Myanmar's annual budget. Yet counterinsurgency capacities have not evolved commensurately.

In the field, the typical soldier is still fighting the same battle, with substandard equipment, inadequate supplies of food and medicine, and the knowledge that if he is seriously wounded in combat, he will likely die before reaching the nearest hospital.

Nowhere in evidence are the tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) that the SPDC purchased from Ukraine and China. According to Australia-based military analyst Andrew Selth, the junta has acquired 50 T-72 tanks from Ukraine and more than 200 Type 69II, Type 59D, Type 80 and Type 85 main battle tanks in addition to 105 Type 63 light tanks from China.

Assembled of 1000 BTR-3U : status uncleared (photo : Militaryphotos)

The regime has also obtained more than 300 Type 85 and Type 90 tracked APCs from China. Another 1,000 BTR-3U wheeled APCs are to be assembled in Myanmar over the next 10 years from parts sent by Ukraine. Yet all of these vehicles are next to useless in the forested and mountainous terrain where most of the counterinsurgency operations take place and are more likely to be used against a possible urban uprising of pro-democracy protesters.

The army's new artillery units are equipped with more than 100 155-millimeter WP52 and 122mm Type 54 howitzers and 30 107mm Type 63 multiple rocket launchers from China, 16 155mm Soltam field guns from Israel, 16 130mm Type 59 field guns from North Korea, and 80 75mm mountain howitzers from India, according to military analyst sources. The only apparent use of heavier artillery, according to reports by the independent Karen Human Rights Group, has been a battery of 120mm mortars being used to shell the area around Ler Mu Plaw camp in northern Karen state.

Nor have the much-talked-about MiG-29s purchased from Russia, nor the older F-7s and A-5s purchased from China, so far been seen in the skies over Karen state. The SPDC purchased 50 Chengdu F-7E/K/M "Airguard" fighters and 48 NAMC (Nippon Aircraft Manufacturing Corp) A-5C/M ground-attack aircraft from China in the 1990s. These were later joined by 10 MiG-29 air-superiority fighters from Russia.

Technicians were brought in from Serbia in 2004 to repair the 12 SOKO G-4 Galeb ground-attack aircraft that had been grounded for many years because of a lack of spare parts. Of little use against mobile guerrilla units, they are also too valuable to risk being shot down by a lucky Karen soldier. Poor maintenance and the lack of spare parts also hinder their use. The same can be said for the Tatmadaw's helicopter fleet, which has carried officials to visit camps and to move supplies to large secure camps.

W-3 Sokol of the Myanmar (photo : Militaryphotos)
The air force has also purchased 12 PZL Swindik W-3 Sokol multi-purpose helicopters and 18 Mil Mi-2 "Hoplite" helicopters from Poland and 12 Mil Mi-17 medium-lift transport helicopters from Russia. All of these helicopters can be configured for a ground-attack role, and according to Andrew Selth, there has been discussion in the Tatmadaw about the use of helicopters in assault operations. To date, however, helicopters have not been used in attacks and generally do not move infantry around, rescue wounded soldiers or send supplies to units in the field either.

Mi-17 of the Myanmar Air Force (photo : Militaryphotos)

Despite all the money being spent on expensive hardware, the common Tatmadaw infantryman is still poorly equipped. Deserters have commented that their backpacks and webbing are of a low quality and the uniforms are so bad that many soldiers try to purchase their own as soon as possible. Many soldiers wear Chinese-style jungle shoes, which wear out after a couple of months and are much inferior to jungle boots.

Since 1996, the SPDC's weapons factories have produced new assault rifles and light machine-guns for the infantry. The MA series of weapons were designed to replace the old German-designed but locally manufactured Heckler and Koch G3s and G4s that equipped Myanmar's army since the 1960s. After more than six years, some units still have not received the new weapons. The ammunition supplied by the regime's munitions factories, especially the 5.56mm for its new rifles, is reportedly very poor and burns too hot. Ethnic opposition sources such as the Karen and Shan say they try not to use captured Tatmadaw ammunition, if possible.

The insurgents have to make do with a motley collection of mostly old automatic rifles and carbines backed up with a few mortars and machine-guns. With the exception of the now-defunct Burmese Communist Party, which received most of its weapons from China, the rebel groups buy their weapons, ammunition and equipment on the black market or capture them from Tatmadaw units during ambushes or raids on encampments. The lack of ammunition has forced some of the insurgent groups to rely very heavily on land mines to protect their camps, supply routes and civilian populations.

The only really useful procurement in fighting ethnic insurgents has been thousands of trucks and four-wheel-drive vehicles obtained from China. In addition, the Tatmadaw has obtained numerous Nissan trucks and Patrol four-wheel-drive vehicles from Japan and locally produces Hino trucks. Using these vehicles, the army has been able to move large numbers of units and concentrate them in eastern Pegu division and northern Karen state.

Elements of six different divisions from various parts of Myanmar, including as far away as Kachin and Arakan states, have been carried on the trucks. These divisions have also been able to rotate their battalions from home areas into and out of the front line. The army has also been able to keep its stockpiles supplied with food and ammunition. Although the use of motorized transport is limited in the rainy season, the trucks are still useful for bringing supplies up to forward staging bases from where they can be portered up to the front-line camps. Before the monsoon rains began, even some of the front-line camps could be supplied by vehicle.

Out of step

At the front, however, Tatmadaw soldiers still must march by foot up steep mountain trails to seek out the soldiers of the Karen National Liberation Army and hunt down its civilian supporters. Expanded road networks and large numbers of trucks have enabled the Tatmadaw to build up large stockpiles at rear bases. However, units at the front line still find themselves short of rations, medicine and sometimes ammunition. Most of the supplies for units on operations must still be carried over mountain trails that are impassable to vehicular transport.

The use of civilians as porters has become common operational practice despite frequent protests by international rights bodies such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the United Nations-sponsored International Labor Organization. Frequent reports have documented the mistreatment and killing of villagers and convicts carrying supplies for the army. This inefficient practice also ties the soldiers to long columns and the use of trails, limiting their operational capabilities. Without the use of helicopters or air drops, the army is almost completely reliant on how much the porters can carry.

Soldiers of the various ethnic armies, although equipped with old weapons, often without enough ammunition, are frequently able to get the better of Tatmadaw units in combat. That's because they are fighting for a homeland cause, and many ethnic insurgents have years of combat experience. They know the terrain intimately, and are conditioned to fight in mountainous and forested areas.

They also usually have the support of the civilian populations where they operate. Most civilians are willing to share food with the guerrillas and help them with carrying supplies. They view the soldiers from same ethnic group as fighting to protect them from the Tatmadaw. This support from the civilian population is also their weakness, and the army's counterinsurgency strategy has long sought to exploit it by targeting them.

Strategy and tactics likewise remain relatively unchanged from decades ago. The guiding strategy is still the so-called "four cuts", which seeks to deprive armed resistance of food, funds, intelligence and recruits by separating them from civilian support. The army implements this strategy by targeting villagers, razing their jungle communities and forcing them out of the hills and mountains. The SPDC has notably shown very little inclination to dedicate resources toward winning the "hearts and minds" of ethnic civilians.

Recent reports from the Free Burma Rangers and the Karen Human Rights Group indicate that army columns have been conducting sweeps of KNU-controlled territory, shooting villagers on sight and destroying their food supplies and crops. True to form, the great majority of casualties inflicted by the army's current year-long operations have been Karen civilians, providing yet further fuel to the fire of Myanmar's long war.

China Arms Myanmar Military Machine

C-802 surface to surface missile (photo : Aviation Week)
Hong Kong, China — China has exported two 16 PA6 shipborne diesel engines to Myanmar to be fitted on its navy's indigenous patrol ships, a representative of the German MAN Diesel Company, which designed the original engines, has confirmed.

The PLA Navy's 054A missile frigate uses four 16 PA6 engines, produced by China under license from MAN Diesel. MAN Diesel was originally the SEMT Pielstick Company, under French ownership, but changed its name following restructuring last year.

China's export of these engines will help Myanmar upgrade its patrol vessels. Since 1998, Myanmar has built three Sinmalaik-class patrol vessels, with help from China in the design and construction of the vessel hulls.

The Sinmalaik-class patrol vessel has a full-load displacement of 1,000 tons and is not fitted with ship-to-ship missiles. The Myanmar navy apparently has plans to develop its own light-duty offshore patrol vessels with China's assistance, and China's provision of the 16 PA6 engines is likely related to this plan.

Most of the major surface combatants of the Myanmar navy were supplied by China, so the navy resembles the PLA Navy in many respects. It has acquired Chinese 40-kilometer-range C-801 ship-to-ship missiles along with 037-G high-speed missile patrol boats. The Myanmar navy altogether has four 037-G fast missile boats, which were all delivered between 1995 and 1997.

China officially issued an export license for its new C-802A ship-to-ship missiles six months ago, intending to promote sales to South and Southeast Asian countries. The C-802A has a range of 180 kilometers and is a replacement for the earlier C-801 and C-802 SSMs.

Not only the Myanmar navy but also its army and air force are equipped with massive Chinese military equipment. For the past 10 years, China has been the largest supplier of arms to the country. Japanese television news broadcast during last September's military crackdown on Buddhist monks showed Myanmar soldiers using Chinese-made Dongfeng trucks and even wearing Chinese helmets.

The army has been equipped with more than 100 Chinese T-69-II main battle tanks and 55 new T-90 armored personnel carriers. A Google Earth satellite photo shows that at least two Chinese A5M attackers have been deployed in the northern city of Mandalay, which can be used for assaults on rebels in the northern part of the country.

China sold more than 22 A5M attackers and at least 50 F-7 fighters to the Myanmar air force in 1991 and 1993. Satellite photos have also shown two Chinese-made Y-8 transporters at the Yangon airport. Also, 12 Chinese Lang Chang K-8 jet trainer aircraft have been sold to the country in the past seven years, the same type sold to the Sudanese air force.

For its part, China is actively pursuing access to Myanmar's natural resources, especially its oil and natural gas. Last year China won a bid to extract natural gas from Myanmar's biggest offshore field, believed to hold as much as 7.7 trillion cubic feet of gas. The gas is to be delivered by a pipeline, yet to be constructed, via Mandalay to China's southern province of Yunnan.

Russia to Sell 20 MiG-29 Fighters to Burma

MiG-29 of Myanmar Air Force (photo : Aeroflight)

Russia is to supply Burma with a further 20 MiG-29 jet fighters, according to the news agency Agence France-Presse, quoting the Russian daily Kommersant on Wednesday.

Russia and Burma signed a contract several weeks ago for the purchase of the aircraft at a cost of nearly 400 million euros (US $570 million), the paper reported, quoting a source close to the Russian arms company Rosoboronexport.

Kommersant said it was the biggest export contract for MiG-29 fighters since a deal with Algeria in 2007.

Burma took delivery of a dozen MiG-29 fighters from Russia in 2001, the paper said.

One source close to Rosoboronexport told the paper that Russia secured the MiG-29 deal by beating off an offer by China to supply Burma with “ultra-modern” J-10 and FC-1 fighters “on very advantageous conditions.”

Russia, a staunch ally of Burma at the UN, is among the country's leading arms suppliers. Russia is to build a “nuclear studies” center in Burma, which will include a 10-megawatt, light water-moderated nuclear reactor.

Malaysian MiG-29N
(click to view full)

In late December 2009, reports surfaced that Myanmar (formerly Burma) had signed a EUR 400 million (about $571 million) deal with Russia’s Rosoboronexport for 20 MiG-29D fighters. Some sources add a deal for more Mi-35 attack helicopters, and place the entire package at EUR 450 million.
The Russian bid reportedly beat a Chinese offer to supply 4+ generation J-10/ FC-20 fighters, or the cheaper JF-17/ FC-1 Thunder lightweight fighter. Implicitly, it also edged out neighboring Malaysia, who is preparing to sell its MiG-29N fleet at a discounted price. This is good news for RAC-MiG, whose financial troubles and low order volume led to a shotgun merger with Russia’s state-owned United Aircraft Corporation, government bailouts, and doubts about the long-term future of its technologies.
By comparison, the Tripartite Core Group (UN, ASEAN, and Burma’s Junta) launched [PDF] a 3-year Post-[Cyclone] Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) in February 2009, appealing for international donations of $691 million…
Myanmar’s air force ordered 12 MiG-29s from Russia in 2001, to supplement a fleet that mostly relies on Chinese F-7 (MiG-21 copy) and J-6/ Q-5 (MiG-19 copy and heavily modified MiG-19 derivative) fighters. Current levels of readiness among the regime’s existing aircraft types are uncertain, and in late January 2010, one of those F-7s crashed, killing the pilot. This is not uncommon with MiG-21s and their derivatives, which can be challenging to fly safely.
China has close relations with Myanmar, and remains one of its main international supporters, so its presence as Russia’s main arms competitor in Myanmar is hardly surprising. Russia’s MiGs gave it a foothold of its own, and the SPDC regime is also cooperating with Russia to build a nuclear power plant, reportedly a Russian 10-megawatt design with low enriched (under 20% U-235) uranium.
Those relations with Russia can be a somewhat touchy subject, it seems. Recently, the SPDC regime sentenced 2 government officials to death for leaking information about state visits to North Korea and to Russia, and about underground tunnels being built around the new capital with North Korean help.

Myanmar's Military Budget to Increase Significantly

Myanmar army during parade (photo : mmmilitary)

Burma's Military Budget to Increase Significantly

At the four-monthly meeting of Burma's top generals held in Naypyidaw during the last week of May, the junta significantly increased its military budget from last year, according to sources close to the Burmese military.

A military source told The Irrawaddy on Thursday that although the amount budgeted to the military is unavailable, it is known to be much larger than last year's military budget.

“The money allocated to the military was budgeted under the heading 'Defense Budget', but there was no specific line items for separate expenses,” he said.

The military source added, however, that it is generally believed that large military equipment purchases will be made within the next six months.

In 2009, Burma signed a contract with Russia for the purchase of 20 MiG-29 jet fighters at a cost of nearly US $570 million.

Analysts believe that many of Burma's future military purchases may come from North Korea.

According to a report by UN experts obtained by The Associated Press last month, North Korea is exporting nuclear and ballistic missile technology and using multiple intermediaries, shell companies and overseas criminal networks to circumvent UN sanctions.

The UN's seven-member panel monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea said its research indicates that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Burma.

In November 2008, Gen Thura Shwe Mann, the regime’s No 3 ranking general, made a secret visit to North Korea and signed a memorandum of understanding, officially formalizing military cooperation between Burma and North Korea with his North Korean counterpart, Gen Kim Kyok-sik.

During his trip to Pyongyang, Shwe Mann also visited sites of secret tunnel complexes built into the sides of mountains to store and shield jet aircraft, missiles, tanks and nuclear and chemical weapons.

In addition, according to Burmese Maj Sai Thein Win, a former deputy commander of a top-secret military factory who defected and brought with him top secret documents and photographs about Burma's nuclear projects, secret underground bunkers and tunnels have been built at many locations in Burma.

Sai Thein Win, who was trained in Burma as a defense engineer and later in Russia as a missile expert, said that about 10,000 Burmese officials have been sent to Russia thus far to study military technology, including nuclear technology.

Sai Thein Win also said in a report that Burma is trying to build medium-range missiles such as SCUDs under a memorandum of understanding with North Korea. “Burma wants to have rockets and nuclear warheads. Burma wants to be a nuclear power,” Sai Thein Win said.

One reason the regime is able to increase its military budget and import expensive military equipment and technology may be its expected increase in energy revenues.

A study by the Washington-based United States Institute of Peace said that Burma's export earnings from the country's growing energy sector will double in the next five years, due mainly to oil and gas transit pipelines now being built from Burma to China. The Institute said the calculation is based on energy exports—mostly gas—accounting for at least 45 percent of the $6.6 billion earnings declared by Burmese interests in 2008.

Burma's military regime is infamous for spending a large percentage of its national budget on the military, rather than on education, health and other public services. According to Burma military experts, 40 to 60 percent of the national budget is allocated to the military.

In contrast, 0.4 percent of the national budget is spent on healthcare, while 0.5 percent is spent for education, according to a report released in 2007 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank based in London.
In other news regarding the four-monthly meeting, according to military sources there was no major military reshuffle in Naypyidaw.

More North Korean Rockets Reported in Myanmar

The M1991 MLRS is a more powerful version of the older M1985. It has 22 launching tubes and fires the same 240-mm rockets. It has various warhead capabilities, including HE-FRAG, smoke, incendiary and chemical. A standard HE-FRAG warhead weights 90 kg and contains 45 kg of explosives. A claimed maximum range of fire is 43 km. (photo : Military Today)

More North Korean Rockets Reported in Burma

North Korean-made truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems have been reportedly set up at Burmese army bases in northern, eastern and central Burma, according to military sources.

The North Korean rockets were recently delivered to missile operation commands in Mohnyin in Kachin State, Naungcho and Kengtung in Shan State and Kyaukpadaung in Mandalay Division, sources said. Missile operation commands were reportedly formed in 2009.

It is not clear when the multiple launch rocket systems were shipped from North Korea. However, military sources said delivery of rocket launchers mounted on trucks occurred several times in recent years.

Sources said they witnessed at least 14 units of 240-mm truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems arrive at Thilawa Port near Rangoon on the North Korean vessel, Kang Nam I, in early 2008. Previous reports said Burma had purchased 30 units of 240-mm truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems from North Korean.

According to GlobalSecurity.org, North Korea produces two different 240mm rocket launchers, the 12-round M-1985 and the 22-round M-1991. The M-1985 rocket pack is easily identified by two rows of six rocket tubes mounted on a cab behind an engine chassis. The M-1991 is mounted on a cab over an engine chassis. Both launch packs can be adapted to a suitable cross-country truck.

The Kang Nam I was believed enroute to Burma again in June 2009. However, it reversed course and returned home after a US Navy destroyer followed it amid growing concern that it was carrying illegal arms shipments.

However, more arms shipments from North Korea appear to have been delivered to Burma in 2009-2010. The latest report about a North Korean vessel's arrival was in April. The ship, the Chong Gen, docked at Thilawa Port. Last week, the junta acknowledged that the Chong Gen was at the port, but it denied involvement in any arms trading with Pyongyang, saying Burma follows UN Security Council resolution 1874 which bans arms trading with North Korea. The junta said the North Korean vessel came to Burma with shipments of cement and exported rice.

According to reports by Burma military experts Maung Aung Myoe and Andrew Selth, purchasing multiple-launch rocket systems is a part of the junta’s military modernization plan. While the junta has acquired 107-mm type 63 and 122-mm type 90 multiple-launch rocket from China, North Korea has provided it with 240-mm truck-mounted launch rocket.

Some experts have said North Korea is also involved in a secret relationship with Burma for the sale of short and medium-range ballistic missiles and the development of underground facilities. Other experts and Burmese defectors claim that North Korea is also providing Burma with technology designed to create a nuclear program.

Burma severed its relationship with North Korea in 1983 following North Korean agents’ assassination of members of a South Korean delegation led by President Chun Doo Hwan. The two countries restored relations in early 1990s and officially re-establish diplomatic ties in April 2007.

Myanmar Buys 50 Mi-24 and 12 Mi-2 from Russia

Mil-Mi-24 helicopter (photo : Flightglobal)

Burma Buys 50 Combat Helicopters

The Burmese Air Force (BAF) has bought 50 Mi-24 helicopters and 12 Mi-2 armored transport helicopters from Russia, according to a source from the BAF.
The purchase of the M-24s marks the first time the BAF, known in Burmese as Tatmadaw-Lay, has procured combat-equipped helicopters. “50 Mi-24 fighter helicopters and a dozen Mi-2s were procured from Russia, and are now being assembled in Flying Training Base in Meikthila,” the source said. “After assembling the helicopters they will be divided among four squadrons at Magwe Air Base and Ela Air Base.”

Burma currently has 15 air bases. Ela Air Base, not far from Burma’s remote capital Naypyidaw, is the newest and is frequently used by Burma's senior military generals and government officials for domestic and international flights.

The procurement of the Mi-24s comes a year after a request was made to Russia by BAF chief Lt-Gen Myat Hein in a bid to modernize Burma's ailing air force and provide a weapon to conduct air strikes against infantry battalions, most likely in Burma's ethnic areas where dozens of armed groups still exert control.

“The main reason for purchasing the Mi-24s is for counter-insurgency,” the source said.

In 1956, the BAF bought six Kawasaki Bell 47G helicopters from Japan, but did not upgrade its fleet until 1975 when the US provided 18 Bell 205A-1 helicopters as part of an anti-narcotics program.

Mil Mi-2 helicopter (photo : Airliners)

Since then, Burma has acquired some 70 helicopters, few of which are still in service. The BAF has traditionally separated its helicopter fleet among air bases at Hmawbi in Rangoon Division, Namsang in Southern Shan State, Taungoo in Pegu Division and Ground Training Air Base in Meikthila, which is in Mandalay Division.

One Mi-17 helicopter crashed in 2001, taking the lives of several senior military officials, including Burmese army Chief-of-Staff Lt-Gen Tin Oo.

An Mi-2 helicopter from Taungoo Air Base crashed in June near Pindaya Township, resulting in four deaths.

The BAF was founded in 1947 before Burma gained independence. Its principal raison d'être for many years was a campaign against the the Burmese Communist Party in the jungles of Burma's north and a decades-long war waged against several the country's ethnic armies, most notably the Karen National Union.